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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper attempts to quantify the short-term impact of takeover rumors on target stock prices. The study was 
conducted on the French stock market between 1997 and 2011 and concerns 200 rumors that appeared in the media 
(news agencies, newspapers, and Web sites). Our results show that this particular kind of information has a 
significant impact on the prices of target companies around and after the date of rumor appearance. The best 
performance of target shares is observed 50 days after the dissemination of the rumors in the media, with an 
average return of 4%. This performance is mainly explained by three components:  credibility, rumor 
characteristics, and the anticipated effects of the takeover bid.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
inancial rumors are seen as the natural consequences of any financial market (Kapferer, 1990). They 
emerge as important and uncertain information, in clear opposition to the notion of perfect 
information promoted by the stock exchange regulatory authorities. The last few years have seen on 
the French stock market the emergence of a particular kind of financial rumors, namely those linked to takeover 
bids, which have received particular attention from diverse quarters, and especially from the French financial 
markets authority (Autorité des marchés financiers - AMF). For instance, the Danone Group was rumored to be the 
target of a takeover by the American group, PepsiCo, in July 2005. Two months after their first appearance, the 
rumors brought a considerable 30% impact on the target share prices. In the end, no offer was submitted, but the 
rumor led to the intervention of the Prime Minister who raised the issue of “the risks of French companies being 
controlled by foreign capital.” Similarly, in February 2006, there were rumors that the Suez Company was targeted 
by the Italian company ENEL. This rumor also led to an intervention from the then Prime Minister who asserted that 
this type of bid is seen as an attack against France.1   
 
In October 2006, responding to these two events, the AMF developed a procedure for dealing with market rumors; 
this procedure became law2. This law requires all companies that are subject to significant and unusual price and/or 
volume variations to report their intentions and, where appropriate, file a public exchange offer.  
 
Recently, at the end of 2010, this law forced the LVMH Group to declare its intentions regarding the Hermès Group 
when LVMH was found controlling 17% of its voting rights after a covert stake increase. Questioned by the AMF, 
the LVMH Group denied wishing to launch a takeover bid on Hermès whose family members had started preparing 
a counter-offer to save the Group. During the week of December 3rd, 2010, the Hermès share price went up about 
12%.3  
 
                                                
1French press office (AFP), February 23rd, 2006.  
2 Section 7, article 223-32 of the General Regulation of the AMF. 
3The first declaration of threshold crossing occurred on October 27th, 2010, at the 14.22% level. On December 21st, 2010, LVHM owned 20.21% 
of the capital and 12.73% of voting rights. See http://www.amf-france.org   (threshold crossing).  
F 
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Despite the ubiquitous and substantial reality of takeover bid rumors on the French stock market, no study has 
focused on the impact and consequences of this phenomenon. Most studies have focused on the U.S. market (Pound 
and Zeckhauser, 1990; Zivney et al., 1996; Gao and Older, 2008) or the Australian market (Clarkson et al., 2006). 
Those studies have shown that takeover bid rumors published only in the Wall Street Journal (U.S. studies) and the 
discussion site Hotcopper.com (Australian market) cause a positive reaction of the target share prices mainly before 
and on the day of their publication. However, findings related to the short-term performance of those shares after the 
spread of rumors are contradictory. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) conclude that the market reacts efficiently to the 
journal announcement, and a buy-and-hold strategy does not benefit the holders of the target shares. This study is 
criticized by Zivney et al. (1996) who assert that the rumors collected by Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) had already 
been published in the “Abreast of the Market” (AOTM) column of the journal. The findings of Zivney et al. (1996) 
show a positive performance over the 100 days following the date of the first publication. Along the same lines, and 
focusing again on the U.S. market, Gao and Older (2008) find positive abnormal returns over the 70 days following 
the publication of the rumors. These three studies focus solely on the rumors that appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal columns, which increases the risk of error regarding the first dates of publication of the rumors since rumors 
may appear in other sources before the journal picks them up.  
 
Against this background, this paper focuses on the study of the impact of takeover bid rumors on share prices and of 
the short-term performance of the share prices of target companies listed on the French Stock Exchange. This will 
result in a first evaluation of the consequences of this phenomenon on the target shares and a proposal for an 
appropriate investment strategy based on their short-term performance. Furthermore, we propose to show the 
potential profit for the shareholders in terms of not only the characteristics of rumors but also certain indicators of 
the target companies. Indicators are used in the studies on the identification of the determining factors for the 
premium offered to the shareholders of target takeover companies.  
 
This study is intended mainly for portfolio managers and particularly the shareholders of target companies who are 
seeking a potential capital gain. Greater understanding of the behavior of target prices will also provide answers to 
the excessive volatility observed when this type of rumors occurs, which should be of interest to regulatory and 
Stock Exchange agencies.  
 
Our paper is divided into four parts. First, we present the review of the literature devoted to measuring the impact of 
takeover rumors and determining the performance of the target companies. We then outline the strategy for rumor 
collection and our methodological approach, and lastly we present and interpret our findings.      
 
The Determining Factors of the Behavior of the Share Prices of Companies Subject to Takeover Rumors 
 
The Potential Gain for The Shareholders of Companies Subject to Takeover Rumors 
 
From a financial perspective, the study of mergers and acquisitions has shown inequitable profit sharing, ranging 
from 20% to 40%, that benefits the shareholders of the target companies (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Various 
studies also mention an abnormal positive reaction of the target share prices mainly preceding the official 
announcements of the takeover bids. The abnormal share behavior is mainly due to the possible rumors circulating 
in the media that precede the formal announcement of the takeover (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989; Gao and Older, 2008). A number of studies have since focused on the impact of the takeover rumors 
on the share prices of target companies and on the expectation of potential gains through speculation solely based on 
this type of information.  
 
Most of the studies devoted to this issue are U.S.-based and focus essentially on takeover rumors published in the 
Wall Street Journal. The methodology of event study is used to measure the reaction of the share prices around the 
dates of the emergence of rumors in the media. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) investigate the behavior of the share 
prices of 42 companies that were the subject of takeover rumors published in the “Heard on the Street” column. The 
authors noted a total of abnormal returns of 7.5% 20 days before the publication of rumors in the journal. Similarly, 
Zivney et al. (1996) indicate that certain rumors that were published in “Heard on the Street” had appeared on 
average 10 days earlier in the AOTM column in the same journal. These findings clearly show a significant reaction 
of share prices with average abnormal returns of 7.78% over the 20 days preceding the publication of the rumors. 
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Conversely, and contrary to the findings of Pound and Zeckhauser (1990), the authors identify an investment 
strategy involving buying shares the day the rumors appear in AOTM and selling them 80 days later. The target 
share performance on that retention period is 6.35% on average. Still focusing on the U.S. market, Gao and Older 
(2008) analyze the behavior of shares that were the target of 159 takeover rumors published in the Wall Street 
Journal between 1991 and 2001. Gao and Older show that the strategy consisting in buying shares targeted by 
takeover rumors and keeping them for 70 days provided average abnormal returns of 4.5% for the total sample. As 
far as the Australian market is concerned, Clarkson, Joyce and Tutticci (2006) analyze the impact of the takeover 
rumors posted on the Hotcopper Internet discussion site (www.hotcopper.com) between May 1st, 1999, and March 
31st, 2000. Clarkson et al. found significant abnormal returns of 1.09%, 2.95%, and 2.37% respectively, two days 
before and on the same day the rumors appeared. The intraday analysis also showed abnormal returns 60 minutes 
before the rumors appeared and 10 minutes afterwards.   
 
Based on these findings, we also hypothesize that takeover rumors will result in a positive reaction of the shares 
prices of the companies listed on the French Stock Exchange.   
 
Determinants of The Premium Offered to The Shareholders of the Companies Subject to Takeover Rumors   
 
Very few studies have sought to explain the short-term performance of stock prices subject to takeover rumors. A 
spate of studies has instead focused on the identification of the determinants of the premium offered to the 
shareholders of the target companies. These investigations obviously take into account those characteristics of the 
target companies that make them possible takeover targets. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that the 
possible reaction of the shares of companies subject to takeover rumors can depend on three categories of variables: 
credibility, rumor characteristics, and the takeover expected effects.    
 
Rumor Credibility 
 
This category incorporates variables that give greater plausibility to the imminence of the takeover bid. Laouiti 
(2014) shows that rumoured target's firms have approximately the same characteristics of the ones identified as 
potentially takeover by the acquisition prediction models. Credibility is thus embodied in those company 
characteristics that, to some degree, appear to facilitate the execution of the takeover, hence increasing the investors' 
belief. This could, in the end, impact on the short-term performance of the target share prices. The company 
characteristics are the following: 
 
a. Size  
 
Takeover bids usually target small companies. Palepu (1986) asserts that as the costs of the buy-out increase with 
the size of the target company, the larger the company, the less chance of success of the bid. Size is expressed in 
terms of the logarithm of the market capitalization   or that of the total assets. Similarly, Clarkson et al. (2006) find 
that the abnormal returns are negatively related to the size of companies subject to takeover rumors on the 
Australian market. Martynova and Renneboog (2011) measure the effect of size by the ratio of target size to 
acquiring size and find no significant relation with the bids-connected abnormal returns. Hence, we hypothesize that 
there is a negative relationship between the size of companies subject to takeover rumors and the abnormal returns 
generated by the appearance of takeover rumors.    
 
b. Sector Affiliation  
 
Cudd and Duggal (2000) measure sector affiliation through a binary variable and show that, apart from their small 
size, the acquired companies did belong to sectors that were marked by a takeover bid during the year preceding the 
official announcement of the operation. In terms of the relationship with abnormal returns, Clarkson et al. (2006) 
test the effects of the affiliation of the targets to those sectors most targeted by takeover rumors on the Australian 
market, but no significant relationship with the abnormal returns found was established. In the same context, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find that there was no significant explanation of the abnormal behavior of share 
prices that could be linked to the target and the bidding companies belonging to the same industry sector. We thus 
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hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the abnormal returns generated by the rumors and the sector 
affiliation variable.  
 
c.  The free float percentage  
 
By definition, the free float of a company corresponds to the part of capital that is dispersed among private investors 
and not held by stable shareholders. A large proportion of free float indicates that the company's capital is not 
sufficiently protected against possible takeover operations; hence, the larger the free float, the greater likelihood of 
the company being the target of a takeover bid. When comparing the impact of takeover bids in Europe, Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) find that target UK companies had the highest abnormal returns. The authors explain that 
these companies are characterized by a higher proportion of free float than that of companies listed in Continental 
Europe. We thus hypothesize that the size of the free float explains the potential gains realized by the shareholders 
of companies subject to takeover rumors. 
  
d.  Undervaluation   
 
Hasbrouck (1985) suggests that acquiring an underevaluated company is a worthwhile financial opportunity for 
buyers. If the bid is successful, the target company should regain at least its basic value, and the buyer will benefit 
from the premium. Hence, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) have shown that acquiring underevaluated companies (low 
market-to-book ratio or high book-to-market ratio) generates considerable abnormal returns. We hypothesize that 
there exists a positive relationship between the abnormal returns of companies subject to takeover rumors and the 
market-to-book ratio.  
 
Rumor Characteristics  
 
This model dimension brings together the variables related to the messages of takeover rumors that may increase 
their credibility without confirming or denying them.  
 
a. Intensity of Publication  
 
The more widespread rumors are, the more attention they attract, and so the greater likelihood that they are believed 
(Kapferer, 1987). Thus, we hypothesize that those rumors most widely reported in the media are those that will have 
a greater impact on the share prices of takeover target companies. 
 
b.  Evidence-Based Arguments 
 
Rumors may appear on their own or bolstered by evidence that justifies their emergence and increases credibility. 
Rumor justifications concern mainly information related to the prospect of takeover regarding the target companies 
(agency issues, low performance, capital movements). We hypothesize that evidence-based or closely argued rumors 
will attract investors’ attention and have a greater impact on the share prices of takeover target companies.  
 
c. Time of Appearance    
 
According to Kimmel (2004), rumors usually emerge in times of growth and lack of communication. In our study, 
we measure the volume of information related to takeover bids to identify the time of appearance of rumors in terms 
of the communication type and possibly the number of rumors. Apart from the communication type and depending 
on the French Stock Exchange regulations, two distinct periods of rumor appearance have emerged. Since October 
2006 and to deal with the excessive volatility of the share prices of takeover target companies, the AMF has adopted 
a law forcing the parties involved in this type of rumors to declare their intentions and possibly file a public tender 
offer. Hence, we hypothesize that this type of regulations will mitigate the impact of the takeover rumors.  
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Motivations and Expected Effects of the Takeover 
 
Apart from credibility and rumor characteristics, a third variable category can help account for the short-term 
performance of the target share prices. The likelihood of the launch of the public bid depends partly on the buyer’s 
motivation to control a specific target company (synergies, efficiency of the target’s management team, agency 
issues). Hence, the more the target of the takeover rumors displays the kind of target characteristics that are in line 
with those advocated in the theory, the more investors will believe that the bid is imminent, and the more significant 
the stock price reaction will be.  
 
a. Financial Synergies 
 
The acquisition is justified by a degree of financial resources complementarity between the target and its buyer. In 
this respect, Palepu (1986) and Barnes (1999) conclude that an appropriate balance is struck by the effects of 
synergies between heavily-indebted companies and those with little debt. A low debt ratio involves the target’s 
unused capacity to incur debt, whereas a heavy debt will inhibit acquisition. Jensen (1988) asserts that the size of the 
premium offered to the target shareholders will be larger when the acquired companies have a substantial debt 
capacity, namely a low debt ratio (long-term debt/ equity capital).  
 
b. Efficiency of the management team  
 
Corporate mismanagement will affect performance and make companies potential takeover targets. Hence, replacing 
an ineffective management team may be argued to justify a takeover. Improving the target performance after the bid 
launch is thus subject to the new leadership being more effective than their predecessors. Manne (1965) and Palepu 
(1986) note that there is a negative relationship between the likelihood of acquisition and the performance of target 
companies before the bid announcement. Furthermore, Servaes (1991), discussing the premium offered to the target 
shareholders, notes that there is a negative correlation between the performance of acquired companies (as measured 
by Tobin's Q ratio) and the observed abnormal returns. Hence, we expect to find a negative relationship between 
Tobin's Q ratio and the potential gain of shareholders of companies subject to takeover rumors. 
 
c. Agency Issues 
 
The free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1988) stipulates that the buildup of cash flow could cause  conflicts between the 
shareholders and  the leadership because the latter could use the financial surplus to build their managerial empires, 
in particular by carrying out unprofitable acquisitions  to the detriment of the shareholders, who are mainly 
interested in high dividends. The theory postulates that accumulating free cash flow could make some companies 
potential targets of takeover bids (Powell, 1997). In these cases, the main motivation for the acquisition is the free 
cash flow that the acquiring companies see as a financial resource. Furthermore, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) establish 
a positive relationship between the abnormal returns linked to takeovers and the volume of free cash flow available 
in the target companies.  
 
DATA, SAMPLE, AND METHOD 
 
Rumor Collection 
 
The takeover rumors were collected from the Factiva4 database, between 1997 and 2011 on the French Stock 
Exchange. All information relating to the characteristics of the target companies were collected from the Thomson 
One Banker and Datastream databases. 
 
The keywords used to collect rumors were the following: acquisition rumors, buy-out rumors, takeover rumors, 
takeover bids, and tender offers. This phase was followed by a review of the relevant literature. We ruled out all 
articles dealing with (1) announcements of takeover bids or other types of acquisition or buy-out particularly linked 
                                                
4The database used gives access to over 10,000 sources of information, including 2,000 national and regional daily newspapers; see http://scd.u-
bordeaux4.fr/Bibli/RE/Guides/Factiva/Memento%20Factiva.pdf 
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to the activity of companies, (2) companies that were not listed on the French Stock Exchange, and (3) repeated 
rumors: when several articles dealt successively with the same rumor, only the first publication date was included5. 
 
We thus kept 200 rumors that had appeared on Euronext Paris between 1997 and 2011. 
 
The keyword-based search led to a number of articles published mainly in French daily newspapers (Le Monde, Le 
Figaro, Les Échos, La Vie Financière). To make sure we identified the first date of rumors, we carried out a second 
search on google.fr, which helped identify three categories of rumors according to the source of dissemination: first, 
the print media (50 rumors); second, Internet sites such as boursorama.com, boursier.com, capital.fr, investir.com 
(66 rumors); finally, combined sources6 including rumors that had appeared in several sources such as press 
agencies (Reuters and the French press office Agence Française de Presse - AFP) and others (Internet sites and/or 
newspapers); this last category comprised 84 rumors. 
 
Out of the 200 rumors we retained, 12.5% are confirmed7. This percentage is higher than the one found by Clarkson 
et al. (2006) regarding the rumors circulating on the forum Hotcopper.com concerning the Australian stock market 
(11.8%), but it is lower than the percentage found by Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) (42.26%) or by Zivney et al. 
(1996) (29.14%) regarding the rumors that appeared in the Wall Street Journal concerning the U.S. market. Those 
rumors that were left out were neither confirmed nor disproved; they represented over half of the entire set of 
collected rumors. This type of rumors is in keeping with the communication policy carried out by some companies 
that will not comment on speculations and rumors regarding their share prices unless they are forced to do so, in 
particular by the AMF. 
 
The analysis of the rumors collected according to the time of appearance revealed an important flow of information 
related to takeovers over the first five months of the year.8 There were also a considerable number of rumors in the 
months of January and April.9  
 
Target Characteristics 
 
To identify the characteristics of companies subject to takeover rumors, we classified our rumor sample according to 
the three compartments of listings on the French Stock Exchange and the business sectors. Table 1 shows the 
analysis according to the size of the companies: there are 132 companies in Compartment A, 38 companies in 
Compartment B, and only 30 companies in Compartment C. It thus appears that takeover bid rumors target 
companies with large market capitalization. In this particular case, the importance of the rumor shows the 
importance of the target, particularly in terms of market capitalization.   
 
The sample analysis according to company size also shows that market capitalization varies between a minimum of 
1 million Euros and a maximum of 101,407 million Euros (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Sample distribution by listing market 
  CAP in Million Euros 
Compartments Rumor targets MIN Average MAX 
Compartment A  132 1006 16638 101407 
Compartment B 38 162 544 994 
Compartment C 30 1 50 130 
Whole sample 200 1 5744 101407 
 
 
                                                
5The intensity of the spread of rumors is examined through the definition of a binary variable.   
6Very few rumors appeared in press agencies only. Rumors in this category first appeared in press agencies, and then were taken up by Internet 
sites, newspapers, or both, on the same day.  
7Confirmed rumors targeted companies that were the subject of a takeover plan with the AMF during the year rumors appeared.  
8A word-based search was carried out on the Factiva database to obtain an approximate measure of the level of information regarding takeovers. 
We noted a particularly high communication level in the first five months of the year.  
9Out of the 200 rumors collected, 115 appeared in the first five months of the year; 30 appeared in January and 28 in April.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2016 Volume 32, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 149 The Clute Institute 
Compartment A: large capitalizations over 1 billion Euros. Compartment B: medium capitalizations between 1 
billion Euros and 150 million Euros. Compartment C: small capitalizations below 150 million Euros. 
In terms of the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) classification, the sample companies are distributed into 9 
sectors including mainly consumer services (5000), industry, financial institutions (8000), technology (9000).  
 
Table 2. Sample distribution by business sector 
N° Business sectors Rumor targets N° Business sectors Rumor targets 
0001 Oil and Gas 3 5000 Consumer services 39 
1000 Basic materials 10 6000 Telecommunication  11 
2000 Industries 34 7000 Utilities 4 
3000 Consumer goods 25 8000 Financial companies 36 
4000 Health 5 9000 Technology 33 
Notes: The sectors are classified according to the Industry Classification Benchmark. The numbers represent the industry codes. The source of 
the data is the Datastream database.  
 
On the Australian market, Clarkson et al. (2006) show that the companies most targeted by takeover bid rumors are 
found in the sectors of basic materials, media, telecommunications, and various industries. 
 
Measurement of The Variables and Presentation of the Model  
 
Measure of Rumor Impact  
 
Event study methodology10  was used to examine the reaction of the target companies share prices at the time of the 
appearance of the rumors (Fama et al., 1969). 
 
In this approach, the market reaction to new information can be measured by the difference between the returns 
actually observed on the market and a theoretical norm that corresponds to the estimated returns in the absence of 
the event. Event study is applied to prices, volume of transactions, and price range. 
 
The event study approach is the same for all types of events. It is usually implemented in four stages: 
 
Stage 1: Determining the study parameters 
 
The study parameters relate mainly to the event date, the time frame, and the study window.  
 
Event and Event Date 
 
The date of the main event of our study corresponds to the date of the first appearance of the rumors in the media. 
Collecting rumors from the Factiva database provided access to several sources, namely Internet sites, newspapers, 
or press agencies. This source diversity brought increased precision regarding the date of the first appearance of the 
rumors, which reduced the risk of errors, in contrast to that revealed in the previous studies that focused on rumors 
collected from one source only.  
 
The time frame or sample period: Armitage (1995) shows that the length of sample periods is usually comprised 
between 100 and 300 days. Estimation of the standard is thus placed on the interval [-260, -21] before the date of 
appearance of rumors. 
 
The study window: it corresponds to the observation period of the stock price reaction around the event date t0. The 
period varies from 10, 20, to 40 days around the announcement date (Armitage, 1995). Following Pound and 
Zeckhauser (1990) and Zivney et al. (1996), our study window is spread over the 40 days around the date of 
appearance of the rumors in the media, namely 20 days before and 20 days after the event date t0. 
 
                                                
10Event study methodology was first applied to measure the impact of capital increases on the trading price of U.S. securities. Since then, the 
method has been used in several studies, whether in the domain of finance or that of other disciplines. 
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Stage 2: Estimating the standard  
 
Over the time frame, the expected profitability in the absence of event is determined through different methods. The 
market model approach is the most commonly used. The market model developed by Fama et al. (1969) provides an 
estimate of the expected profitability of the shares in terms of the risk incurred and the marked return. Within this 
framework, Brown and Warner (1985) carry out simulations and obtain the best results with the market model best 
adapted to this type of approach. 
 
Stage 3: Calculating abnormal returns   
 
Applying the market model to determine the expected returns on the event window first involves estimating the 
market model coefficients in terms of the securities returns and the market index in the time frame.  
An ordinary least squares regression method is applied: 
 
Rit =αi +βiRmt +εit  
 
where: t ∈ [-260, -21]  
 
Rit: returns of share i at date t;  
 
Rmt: returns of market index at date t. In our study, we use the SBF 120 index. Index selection was governed by the 
size of our sample, but also by the company characteristics, particularly that of size. Most of our sample companies 
were in compartment A that includes the largest capitalizations quoted on the French Stock Exchange. 
 
εit  : model error  
 
αi et βi  : coefficients to be estimated through the ordinary least squares method. 
 
The estimation results show the following expected returns for each company in the study window, in terms of the 
estimated coefficients in the time frame:  
 
E( Riτ )= αˆi + βˆiRmτ  
 
where: t ∈ [-20, +20] 
 
E(Rit) : expected returns in the absence of event of share i at date t;  
 
Rmt: returns of SBF 120 index at date t, 
 
αˆ et βˆ  : are the coefficients estimated through the ordinary least squares method. 
 
If the takeover bid rumors include relevant information for investors, they should be accompanied by a price 
reaction showing abnormal returns in the study period.  
 
This reaction is measured through the difference between the observed returns and the theoretical returns as 
calculated in the study window.  
 
RAit = Rit − E( Rit )  
 
RAit = Rit − ( αˆi + βˆiRmt )  
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where:  
 
Rit: returns of share i in the estimation period 
 
Rmt: returns of the index, the index used was   SBF 120 
 
αˆi et βˆi  : coefficients estimated through the ordinary least squares method in the time frame. 
 
Once the abnormal returns have been calculated for each company, an average is calculated for the whole sample for 
each of the 41 days of the study window.  
 
RAMt =
1
200 RAiti=1
200
∑  
 
where: t ∈ [-20, +20] 
 
The short-term performance of the target stock prices subject to takeover rumors is also measured in terms of the 
returns generated by applying a buy-and-hold strategy. Barber and Lyon (1997) explain that this strategy provides a 
measure of the investors’ experience over the period under study. The authors recommend using this estimator to 
calculate short-term performance.  
 
The returns generated by the buy-and-hold strategy (BAHAR) are estimated for each company in our sample and 
measured according to the following formula: 
 
BAHARit = (1+ rit )− (1+ E( rit )
t=0
T
∏
t=0
T
∏ )  
 
where: rit : observed returns of share  i at date t  
 
E(rit) : expected returns of share i at date t estimated through the market model.  
 
The average returns are then calculated over various hold periods11 according to the following formula:   
 
BAHABt = 1200 BAHARiti=0
t
∑  
 
The tests are applied on the averages of the abnormal values observed for the whole sample according to the 
hypothesis H0 that the RAMt and the BAHRt are equal to zero. The significance tests of Sign, the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, and the cross-sectional Student test are used for results validation.   
 
The Sign test involves estimating the statistics Z1 according to the formula below. Under hypothesis H0, Z1 follows a 
standard normal distribution.  
 
Z1 =
N
+
−
( N
+
+ N
−
)
2
( N
+
+ N
−
)
4
≅ N( 0 ,1 )
 
                                                
11 The periods change in 10-day intervals from the date 0 of the appearance of rumors. The periods vary from 10 to 150 days after the 
announcement. Gao and Older (2008) used two methods to calculate the abnormal returns in the study windows. 70 days after the rumors had 
appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the authors found a difference between the two measures (cumulative abnormal returns of 4.29% and 
abnormal returns generated by the buy-and-hold of 4.5%. Both values are positive at the 10% level.)  
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N
+
and N
−
are respectively the number  of abnormal values  (returns, volumes, and price ranges) strictly positive and 
negative at a given date.  
 
The Z2 statistics also follows a standard normal distribution and is estimated through the Wilcoxon rank test on a 
self-matched sample that can take into account both the sign of abnormal performance and the amplitude.  
 
Z2 =
Wn
+ −
n( n+1 )
4
1
24 n( n+1 )( 2n+1 )
≅ N( 0 ,1 )  
 
The test is calculated as follows: In a sample n (200), the abnormal returns in absolute value are first sorted in 
ascending order. To each abnormal value i is attributed a rank Kit in terms of its position. Each rank is then 
multiplied by the indicator variable 1
R+
that is equal to 1 if the observed abnormal value is positive; 0 if not, the sum 
of the multiplications is equal to the coefficient Wn+ = Kit1R+
t=1
200
∑   
 
The cross-sectional Student test is calculated as follows:  
 
θ =
RAMt
σˆ ( RAMt )
≅T(199 )  
 
where 
 
σˆ ( RAMt )=
1
200
σˆ ( RAt )  
 
and 
 
σˆ ( RAMt )=
1
200
σˆ ( RAt )  
 
Measuring the Determining Factors  
 
As previously suggested, the potential gain for the shareholders of the target companies is explained in terms of 
three categories of variables whose associated measures are presented below. A linear regression calculated by the 
ordinary least squares method is then applied to the investors’ maximum gain as measured through the abnormal 
returns of the buy-and-hold BAHARi.  
 
BAHARi = β0 +β1TAILLEi +β2SECTi +β3FLOTTi +β4SEVi +β5SCi +β6ARGi +β7PERIO
+β8REG +β9ENDETT +β10EED+β11FCF +εi
 
 
 
Rumor Credibility 
 
The size, sector affiliation, free float percentage, and undervaluation of the target are variables that give sense to the 
takeover rumor, hence increasing its credibility for investors.   
 
The SIZE variable shows the size of the target company and is measured in terms of the total assets logarithm. SECT 
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the target belongs to a sector targeted by a takeover bid during the year preceding 
the appearance of rumors and to 0 if not. Flott determines the percentage of the target capital released to the public 
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and not held by the main shareholders, expressed as square root. SEV is a variable that measures the undervaluation 
of the target; it is expressed in terms of the market-to-book ratio. 
 
Rumor Characteristics  
 
Rumor characteristics are mainly expressed through three variables: SC is a binary variable that shows the 
dissemination intensity; it is equal to 1 if the rumor has appeared in several sources and to 0 if not. ARG is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the rumor is accompanied by details concerning the motivation behind the bid and to 0 if not. 
PERIO is a binary variable equal to 1 if the rumor appeared during the first five months of the year and to 0 if not.  
REG is a binary variable equal to 1 if the rumor appeared after October 2006 and to 0 if not.   
 
Motivations and Expected Effects of the Takeover 
 
This category brings together variables linked to the characteristics of the target companies that make them potential 
takeover targets. ENDETT shows the debt capacity of the target companies; it is measured by the long-term debt/ 
equity capital ratio. EED shows the efficiency of the management team expressed through Tobin’s Q ratio. FCF 
shows a possible agency issue of the target companies, particularly in the case of accumulation  
 
FINDINGS 
 
Rumor Impact and Short-Term Performance 
 
The findings of the event study show that there are significant positive abnormal returns the day before and on the 
day rumors appear, respectively of 0.58% and 2.66% (see Table 3). These findings are aligned with those of 
Clarkson et al. (2006) or those of Zivney et al. (1996) that indicate an abnormal reaction of the target companies’ 
shares before the date but mainly on the day of the appearance of the appearance of the rumors. The cumulative 
abnormal returns calculated in the windows [-20, -1] and [-10,-1] are 1.3% and 0.78%. Although these values are 
positive, they are inferior to those found by Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) on the U.S. Stock Exchange. Pound and 
Zeckhauser found that over the 20 days preceding the appearance of rumors, the cumulative abnormal return was 
7.5% and significantly positive. Zivney et al. (1996), however, pointed out that the rumors had appeared 10 days 
before in another column of the newspaper.   
 
In our study, determining the date of the first appearance of rumors led us to diversify the data collection sources, 
thus reducing the risk of error in publication dates. This could possibly explain why there are low cumulative 
abnormal returns before the date of appearance, in contrast to previous studies. 
 
Moreover, Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) and Kymez (2001) suggest that the price reaction before the date of rumor 
announcements could be explained by the leaking of information leading to the private use of rumors before these 
are published. According to Kiymaz (2001), it is mainly financial analysts who covertly spread information among 
their clients and relatives. In this context, a survey carried out among financial analysts and brokers in the U.S. 
market revealed that the first channel used for the spread of rumors was the telephone, followed by the media 
(Shindler, 2007).  
 
The price reaction before the appearance of rumors, however, could stem from certain investors’ behavior, whether 
operators or parties involved in the bid, who adopt a pump-and- dump strategy. The idea is to buy a number of 
shares from a company, then launch rumors or purchase recommendations through spam or Internet forum 
discussions in order to attract potential investors. The latter fall into the trap; they buy an important number of 
shares, which will abruptly drive up the share price. The unscrupulous speculator, source of these financial 
movements, then simply sells the shares bought at a low price. This strategy, seen as price manipulation12 and 
dissemination of unfounded information, is punishable by the AMF.  
                                                
12Among our sample companies, an inquiry was launched in 2005 following Alcan's public offer to acquire Pechiney. The rumors had been 
circulating since 2003. The investigations regarding the case of Danone in 2005 demonstrated that the rumors came from the sister of the then 
CEO of Danone, who was the editor-in-chief of Challenges.  
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Table 3. Average abnormal returns in the study window [-5, +5] 
Days  AAR  (%) Wilcoxon p Sign p Student p 
-5 0.35 0.57 0.57 0.07 0.94 1.57 0.12 
-4 -0.24 -0.19 0.85 -0.22 0.82 -0.55 0.58 
-3 -0.19* -1.51 0.10 -1.11 0.27 -1.87 0.06 
-2 -0.02 -0.53 0.60 -0.37 0.71 0.30 0.76 
-1 0.58*** 3.17 0.00 3.04 0.00 2.08 0.04 
0 2.66*** 7.73 0.00 6.00 0.00 3.99 0.00 
1 0.34 -0.51 0.61 -0.30 0.77 1.45 0.15 
2 -0.06 0.44 0.66 0.96 0.34 0.13 0.89 
3 -0.08 0.97 0.33 -0.82 0.41 -1.00 0.32 
4 0.27 -0.27 0.79 -0.30 0.77 1.57 0.12 
5 -0.14 0.93 0.36 1.11 0.27 -0.08 0.93 
200 
Notes: Average abnormal returns (AAR) correspond to the average of the differences between the actual share returns and the market model-
estimated returns. The date 0 corresponds to the day a rumor appeared in the various sources. The significance of the average abnormal returns 
(AAR) is validated in terms of the non-parametric tests of Wilcoxon signed rank-test and the Sign test. The values of the tests are similar, but the 
interpretation of the findings follows the Wilcoxon signed rank-test, since this test takes into account not only the sign of the variables but also 
their rank in relation to the whole sample. 
***significance at 1%; ** significance at 5%, and* significance at 10%. 
 
 
Figure 1. Abnormal returns in the window [-10, +10] 
 
 
Short-Term Performance Of The Target Stock Prices  
 
Results show that the price reaction in the rumor post-appearance period is significantly positive in the majority of 
study windows. This is validated by the significant values of the abnormal returns generated through the buy-and-
hold strategy that better represent the reality of the investment (Barber and Lyon, 1997)  
 
Table 4. Measures of the performance of the target companies subject to rumors in the post-announcement period 
Windows BAHAR (%) Wilcoxon Sign θ 
[0. +10] 2.51*** 3.53 2.61 3.65 
[0. +20] 3.34*** 2.85 1.86 3.70 
[0. +30] 2.61** 1.86 1.42 2.42 
[0. +40] 2.22 3.53 0.52 1.86 
[0. +50] 4.04*** 3.07 2.31 3.03 
[0. +60] 1.74 0.84 0.00 0.99 
[0. +70] 2.82 1.44 1.27 1.29 
[0. +80] 2.16 0.96 1.27 1.07 
[0. +90] 1.72 0.68 0.82 0.80 
[0. +100] 0.68 0.29 0.67 0.32 
[0. +150] -4.21 -1.12 0.52 -1.33 
200 
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Notes: The BAHARs show the abnormal returns of the buy-and-hold calculated in the various windows. The Sign test, the Wilcoxon signed 
rank-test, and the cross-sectional Student test are applied to validate the significance of returns. *** significance at 1%, **significance at 5%, * 
significance at 10%. 
Figure 2. Short-term performance of the target stock prices subject to rumors 
 
 
Results indicate that the share prices show a positive reaction from the first 10 days, with abnormal returns of 
BAHARs of 2.51% significantly positive at 1%. The increase of the share prices continues and reaches its peak at 
about the 50th day after the first appearance of the rumors in the market. At that date, the abnormal returns 
generated by the buy-and-hold strategy reach 4.04% and are significant at the 1% level. From the 60th day, prices 
start falling, and the abnormal returns generated by the buy-and-hold strategy in the window  [0, +60] remain 
positive though not significant.   
 
Our results thus show that the best investment strategy is to buy the target stock prices the day takeover bid rumors 
appear in the media and sell 50 days later; the abnormal returns thus generated amount to 4.04%. Nevertheless, this 
performance is inferior to that found by Gao and Older (2008) after holding the shares for 70 days (4.5%) and by 
Zivney et al. (1996) after 80 days (6.35%).  
 
By the same logic, the strategy of holding the target stock prices beyond 100 days after the first appearance of the 
rumors does not bring benefits to the investors. The performance observed at 150 days is not significant. This 
finding is in line with those of Pound and Zeckhauser (1990), Zivney et al. (1996) and Gao and Older (2008). These 
studies have shown there were no positive and significant abnormal returns in the period beyond 100 days after the 
first rumor appearance. 
 
Determining Factors of the Gain for the Target Shareholders 
 
Table 5 shows significant relations between the abnormal returns calculated 50 days after the first rumor appearance 
and certain variables of the three categories, namely credibility, rumor characteristics, and expected takeover effects.    
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Table 5. Determining factors of short-term performance 
Components Variables coefficients t p 
(Constant) -0.071 -1.096 0.275 
Credibility  
SIZE -0.006* -1.645 0.102 
SECT -0.023 -0.964 0.337 
FLOTT 0.015** 2.353 0.020 
SEV -0.013** -2.204 0.029 
Characteristics  
SC 0.037** 1.983 0.049 
ARG 0.040** 2.076 0.040 
PERIO 0.057*** 2.878 0.005 
REG -0.044*** -2.092 0.038 
Expected effects (interests) of the 
takeover 
ENDETT -0.012** -1.856 0.065 
EED 0.039 1.075 0.284 
FCF 0.090*** 2.204 0.029 
Model statistics 
R2 0.293 
F 5.424 
p 0.000 
Notes: SIZE indicates the size of the target company as measured in terms of the total assets logarithm. SECT is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
target belongs to a sector targeted by a takeover bid during the year preceding the appearance of rumors and to 0 if not. Flott, is the square root of 
the free float and determines the percentage of the target capital released to the public and not held by the main shareholders. SEV is a variable 
that measures the undervaluation of the target; it is expressed in terms of the market-to-book ratio. SC is a binary variable that shows the 
dissemination intensity; it is equal to 1 if the rumor has appeared in several sources and to 0 if not. ARG is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
rumor is accompanied by details concerning the motivation behind the bid and to 0 if not. PERIO is a binary variable equal to 1 if the rumor 
appeared during the first five months of the year and to 0 if not. REG is a binary variable equal to 1 if the rumor appeared after October 2006 (the 
date of the implementation of the law regarding takeover rumors) and to 0 if not. ENDETT shows the debt capacity of the target companies; it is 
measured by the long-term debt/ equity capital ratio. FCF shows a possible agency issue of the target companies, particularly in the case of 
accumulated free cash flow; the variable is expressed through the free cash flow/total assets ratio. 
***, **, *: statistics are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
In terms of rumor credibility, the negative sign of the coefficient of the SIZE variable shows a negative relationship 
with the abnormal returns observed; this finding is aligned with the results found by Clarkson et al. (2006). In this 
perspective, the investors’ reaction is greater when the rumor targets small-sized companies. This notion is 
supported by the results of studies focusing on the profiles of target companies that show the negative relationship 
between the likelihood of acquisition and the size of the target (Palepu, 1986; Hansen 1987). Furthermore, results 
show that the sector affiliation of the targets does not appear to have a significant link with the abnormal returns 
observed. In contrast, the free float percentage explains positively the short-term performance of the companies 
subject to takeover rumors. These rumors gain credibility when the target capital is widely disseminated among the 
public, thus increasing the likelihood of acquisition. A negative link is also found between the book-to-market ratio 
and the BAHARs (0, +50); the price reaction is all the stronger when the rumors target, inter alia, undervalued 
shares. Undervaluation of target shares is among the supporting assumptions linked to takeover operations 
(Hasbrouck, 1985). A low market-to-book ratio means that the share market value does not show its real value, 
which will encourage the predatory practices of some companies wishing to acquire at lower prices.   
 
When considering the “rumor characteristics component”, results show the positive influence   of the intensity of 
publication, rationale, and the time of appearance of the rumors on the observed performance. The investors’ gain is 
all the more important if the rumor (1) is carried by several media in the first few days, (2) is accompanied by 
evidence that justifies its presence on the market and reinforces its credibility, and (3)  has appeared during the first 
five months of the year, more particularly in January and April. In addition to these three variables, rumor 
characteristics are also expressed in terms of the REG variable. The latter’s coefficient is negative and shows a 
short-term loss of performance of the target stock prices subject to takeover rumors after the year 2006.13 In part, 
this result attests to the effectiveness of the law passed by the AMF and designed to reduce the excessive price 
volatility of target companies confronted by this type of rumors.    
 
The last component, “expected results (interests) of the takeover” shows the rationale for the takeover and possibly 
for the emergence of rumors. Three main hypotheses explaining growth operations have emerged in the literature: 
                                                
13Before that period, abnormal returns observed over 50 days reached 6% on average.  
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synergy effects, the effectiveness of the management team, and agency issues. The regression results indicate a 
significant negative effect of indebtedness shown in terms of the long-term debt/equity ratio. Hence, the stronger the 
price reaction, the less indebted the company is. In this particular case, acquiring the target is motivated by its spare 
debt capacity, which represents a potential source of funding for the buyers, which then explains the synergy effect 
(Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1999). This is borne out by the positive relationship between the abnormal returns and the 
free cash flow level that is available in the target company. As acquisition is explained by the accumulation of free 
cash flow, there is evidence of an agency issue (Jensen, 1988). Investors react far more to rumors that target 
companies with surplus liquidity that appears as a source of funding for buyers. The last variable in the category of 
"expected results (interests) of the takeover" relates to the lack of effectiveness of the target’s management team. 
Results show a non significant positive relationship between Tobin's Q ratio and abnormal returns.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the last few years, the French Stock Exchange has been particularly hit by an important phenomenon, namely 
takeover bid rumors. Following the emergence of rumors concerning their potential acquisition, groups such as 
Hermès, Société Générale or Danone have experienced excessive share price volatility. Since 2006, attesting to the 
seriousness of the issue, the AMF has set in place a specific management mechanism to deal with this type of 
rumors.   
In this context, the main goal of our study was to examine the short-term performance of companies subject to 
takeover rumors and to identify their determining factors. The study thus covered the French Stock Exchange and 
focused on 200 rumors collected between 1997 and 2011, using the Factiva database.   
 
The results of the event study show positive abnormal returns around the date of appearance of the rumors in the 
media. Our findings also show that the price reaction reaches its peak around the 50th day after that date. Holding 
stock prices targeted by this type of operation thus proves to be highly beneficial to investors, bringing an average 
gain of almost 4%.  
 
Based on hypotheses predicting takeovers and on the determining factors for the premium offered to the 
shareholders of the target companies, we have also presented a model designed to examine the variations of the 
abnormal performance of target companies over the period following the appearance of the takeover rumors. Three 
categories of explanatory variables were identified: credibility, rumor characteristics, and expected results (interests) 
of the takeover.  
 
We found that the investors’ potential gain varies positively with the free float, the intensity of publication, the 
rationale presented, the time of appearance, and the free cash flow level of the target. Conversely, a negative gain 
relation was found with the market-to-book ratio and the size of targets. The shareholders’ premium tends to 
diminish after 2006, in other words after the implementation of the law concerning declarations of intent related to 
takeover rumors.   
 
Our various results and the perspectives of stock agencies have indicated that the rumor management procedure has 
eventually enabled the partial cushioning of the impact of takeover rumors. Hence, we support the French legislative 
direction promoting the strengthening of regulations concerning the management of this type of information. In the 
meantime, the shareholders of target companies and the portfolio managers will continue using these rumors to 
speculate and optimize their investment strategies, taking into account the performance determining factors we have 
identified.   
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